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The Help America Vote Act (HAYA) provided 
states with federal funds to upgrade their 
voting systems and improve election admin-
istration. To comply with the law, states had 
to develop implementation plans and meet 
established deadlines for voting safeguards 
(i.e .. provisional voting and voter identification 
for first-time voters who register by mail), a 
statewide voter registration list, and voting 
system standards. Yet HAVA allowed states to 
implement the requirements in different ways, 
and they were expected to take advantage 
of that flexibility. As political scientist Robert 
Montjoy observed, HAVA's goal of providing 
uniform and nondiscriminatory standards for 
federal elections applies "within states, not 
across states."! This paper seeks to address 
a fundamental question: How did states 
with decentralized election systems adapt 
to a federal law that required greater state 
centralization and responsibility for election 
administration? 
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Our focus is on both the causes for the 
variations in state compliance with HAVA and 
the consequences of HAVA requirements 
for election administration, with particular 
emphasis on the experiences of New Jersey, 
New York, and Pennsylvania in implementing 
HAVA. We identify administrative, political, 
and policy-related reasons for variations in 
HAVA compliance in each state. We also con-
sider the effects ofHAVA on state and local 
government interactions, funding decisions, 
and policy innovation. We begin by reviewing 
HAVA compliance requirements, describing 
how states responded to those requirements, 
and comparing New Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania with the national norms for 
compliance. 
HAYA COMPLIANCE: VARIATIONS 
ACROSS THE STATES 
HAVA is a "modified direct order" from the 
federal government to the state governments 
because it consists of a combination of incen-
tives and requirements.2 Incentive grants are 
provided under Title I of the act to support 
election administration and replace punch 
cards and lever machines with electronic voting 
machinery. HAVA also provided states with 
funds under Title II to meet requirements in 
Title 111 under specified deadlines:3 
• January I, 2004, for compliance by the 
states with provisional voting, voter identifi-
cation, and voting information requirements 
(Section 302); 
• January I, 2004, with potential for a waiver 
to January I, 2006, for compliance with 
computerized statewide voter registration 
list and voting information requirements 
(Section 303); and 
• January I, 2006, for compliance with voting 
systems requirements, including: preventing 
overvotes by allowing a voter to verify, 
correct, or change a ballot before a vote is 
cast; providing a permanent paper record 
that can be used in an audit; allowing the 
disabled to cast an independent and secret 
ballot; meeting the language minority 
requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965; ensuring that voting systems do not 
contain error rates that exceed Federal 
Election commission standards; and 
establishing a uniform definition of a vote 
(Section 301).4 
Although all states were required to meet 
the deadlines under Title Ill, they operated on 
different schedules and differed in how they 
spent HAYA funds and how they implemented 
the requirements under Title 111.5 
With respect to voting safeguards, all but 
five states, including New Jersey, had provi-
sional voting in place by the January I, 2004, 
deadline.6 New York allowed provisional 
voting before the 2000 presidential election 
and Pennsylvania adopted provisional voting 
legislation in 2002, prior to the passage of 
HAVA.7 Ten states, including New Jersey and 
New York, failed to comply with HAVA's voter 
identification requirement by the deadline.a All 
states, however, met HAYA requirements for 
provisional voting and voter identification in 
time for the 2004 presidential election. 
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Compliance with statewide voter registration 
requirements under HAYA has been a greater 
challenge for many states. Forty-one states 
applied for a waiver of the January I, 2004, 
deadline. By the January I, 2006, deadline, at 
least 40 states had a statewide voter registra-
tion database compliant with HAYA, including 
Pennsylvania. Several others, including New 
jersey, were nearing completion of a statewide 
database, while New York was far behind in 
complying with this requirement.9 
Although we do not have reliable surveys on 
compliance with all of the voting system stan-
dards in Title Ill, in one ofthe most important 
areas of compliance-providing access for 
voters with disabilities-over one third of 
states had nof provided at least one machine 
that would allow the disabled to cast an inde-
pendent and secret ballot by January I, 2006.10 
Many states that accepted federal funds to 
replace punch cards and lever machines did 
not meet the deadline. New Jersey has been 
relatively successful by comparison to other 
states. New York expects new machines to 
be certified by 2007, though it has not yet 
contracted with a vendor. Pennsylvania contin-
ues to operate with a medley of optical scan, 
DRE, lever, and hand-counted paper ballots. 
We take up the issue of voting machinery in 
greater detail in the case studies below. 
States needed to complete an implementa-
tion plan to apply for any funds under HAYA, 
including estimates of how HAYA funds would 
be spent on various aspects of election reform. 
These initial estimates were often adjusted 
afterthe plans were submitted; for instance, 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania received more 
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TABLE I 
Allocations and Percentage of HAVA Funds by Major Category (in millions of dollars)* 
Spending Category New jersey New York Pennsylvania** National Ave. 
Voting Equipment $48.6 $190.0 $76.1 $30.1 
(58.0%) (86.0%) (61.0%) (57.2%) 
Registration Database $25.0 $20.0 $13.1 $12.8 
(30.0%) (9.0%) (10.0%) (23.3%) 
Voter Education/Poll $4.0 $10.0 $7.2 $4.1 
Worker Training (6.0%) (5.0%) (5.0%) (9.6%) 
Provisional Voting $1.0*** 0.0 $.2 $.02 
(1.0%) (0.0%) (< 1.0%) (4.3%) 
Other**** $6.2 $1.0 $26.5 $.03 
(7.0%) (<1.0%) (21.0%) (5.5%) 
Total $88.8 $221.0 $123.2 $52.7 
Sources: For New jersey. HAVA Executive Summary.April 13, 2005; for Pennsylvania, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
State Plan As Amended, September 15, 2005, p. 35; for New York, New York State Board of Elections, May 24, 2006. 
* Numbers may not add to I 00 percent due to rounding. 
**The Pennsylvania data-breakouts and total-reflect appropriations of federal funds for 2003 and 2004, and do 
not include additionalTft:le II funs estimated at about $40 million for receipt in 2005. 
***The New jersey HAVA State Plan allocated $1 million for provisional voting; a figure left out of the more recent 
executive summary. 
**** Other expenses refer to office, transportation, salaries, and voter registration. 
federal funds than anticipated by their original 
plans. As Table I indicates, states planned to 
spend a majority of HAYA funds on replacing 
and upgrading voting equipment. All three 
states expected to spend near the national 
average percentage of funds on replacing and 
upgrading voting equipment. 
COMPARING NEW JERSEY, NEW 
YORK, AND PENNSYLVANIA 
New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania have 
strikingly similar political and institutional char-
acteristics. All three neighboring states have 
predominantly individualistic political cultures, 11 
politically competitive electoral systems, pro-
fessional state legislatures, and governors with 
strong institutional powers.12 All three states 
score high on the dimensions of state aid to 
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local government and direct state spending.13 
They also had similar election systems prior 
to the passage of HAYA All three states had 
decentralized systems of elections, wherein 
the states provided no funds to localities for 
election costs, no training of election officials, 
and the localities purchased their own voting 
equipment, albeit with the approval of the 
state.14 None of the three states required any 
form of voter identification prior to HAYA.IS 
They differed, however, on other aspects. For 
instance, although at least some voters in all 
three states voted on lever machines prior 
to HAYA, New York led the way with lever 
machines in use statewide. New Jersey had 
largely moved to direct-recording electronic 
systems (DRE), and Pennsylvania voters cast 
ballots on a wide range of systems. New York 
and New Jersey had some form of provisional 
balloting, though only New York's policy was 
standard across the state. New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania had compilation registration data-
bases that gave localities authority to make 
changes to voter rolls, whereas New York had 
no such database. Given the similarities and a 
few differences in election systems among the 
three states, we consider how each responded 
to HAVA's requirements and incentives. 
PENNSYLVANIA AND HAVA: 
MOSTLY ON SCHEDULE 
Pennsylvania is distinctive from New Jersey 
and New York for its accelerated timing of 
election reform and for its timely compliance 
with HAVA mandates. In the aftermath of the 
2000 election, Republican Governor Tom 
Ridge established a Voting Mobilization Task 
Force via Executive Order; and the General 
Assembly created a Joint Select Committee to 
Examine Election Laws. Then, the Pennsylvania 
legislature (General Assembly) passed legisla-
tion to create a statewide voter registration 
database (Act 3 of 2002), provisional voting, 
and identification requirements (Act 2002-
150) in advance ofHAVA.16 
These election reforms enacted by the 
legislature were "incremental," hastened by 
"fears of a 'Florida' election and the emerging 
realization of the weak capacity of existing 
election law" but limited by partisan divisions 
over reforms, such as voter identification, that 
could advantage or disadvantage Republicans 
or Democrats,17 The voter identification issue 
resurfaced again in 2006, when the Repub-
lican-controlled General Assembly adopted 
legislation requiring all voters to present identi-
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fication at the polls-not just first-time voters 
as stipulated in HAVA. Democrat Governor 
Edward Rendell vetoed the bill, contending 
that it would place an onerous burden on 
urban voters. 
Following enactment of HAVA, two 
implementation boards authorized in the 2002 
Pennsylvania legislation were appointed-the 
Voting Standards Development Board and 
State Plan Advisory Board. Pennsylvania's 
HAVA Implementation Plan was adopted in 
2003, with amendments filed with the Election 
Assistance Commission in 2004 and 2005. 
Pennsylvania complied with the HAVA 
January I, 2004, deadline regarding provisional 
voting and voting information. The state 
requested arid received waivers to January I, 
2006, of the January I, 2004, deadlines for 
replacement of lever machines and punch card 
systems, and establishment of the statewide 
voter registration database. As of January I, 
2006, Pennsylvania had met the statewide 
database and voting systems mandates of the 
act. Nonetheless, Pennsylvania experienced 
complications in bringing the statewide 
database system on-line, timely selection and 
delivery of replacement voting machines, and 
voter identification requirements at the polling 
place. 
SURE 
Pennsylvania's Statewide Uniform Registry of 
Electors (SURE) was a long-sought response 
to discontent at both county and state levels 
for many years before HAV A' B Prior to the 
adoption of SURE, each of the state's 67 coun-
ties "administered its own voter registration 
records, and county officials had no means 
to crosscheck these records with the records 
of other counties." 19 SURE is the clearest 
evidence of greater centralization of election 
administration in Pennsylvania. Established 
in law in January 2002, nine months before 
HAYA, and developed by Accenture, SURE 
was fully operational by the January I, 2006, 
deadline. The process, however, of developing 
and implementing this centralized voter regis-
tration database was not entirely smooth. 
Initial reactions to SURE varied according 
to whether counties had "Chevrolet" or 
"Cadillac" voting systems.20 Smaller and rural 
counties-with Chevrolets-were "grateful 
for a better voter registration system."21 "We 
all used to do our own thing," the director of 
elections of Wayne County observed, "Now 
we feel more comfortable that other coun-
ties are doing as we are."22 Larger counties, 
notably, Allegheny, Philadelphia, and Mont-
gomery-with Cadillacs-had systems in place 
that were more sophisticated than SURE. 
Philadelphia, for example, with an electronic 
registration system which incorporated images 
of completed voter registration forms (with 
signatures) for its nearly one million voters, 
resisted linkage with SURE which did not 
include such images.23 
The technical challenges of creating a state-
wide electronic voter database were not 
trivial. As Philadelphia officials anticipated, 
SURE was not initially capable of efficiently 
handling the electronic transfer of about one 
million registrations from Philadelphia without 
slowing down the entire state system. An 
unrealistically fast development timeframe of 
one and one-half years, under a 2002 state 
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contract with Accenture during the administra-
tion of Governor Ridge, contributed greatly to 
start-up problems. An external, independent 
review initiated by Governor Rendell, Ridge's 
successor, led to a three-year renegotiated 
contract with Accenture and a "PA SURE-Go 
Forward Strategy" in 2005. There are still 
technical challenges, local and state officials 
agree, but the level of intergovernmental 
cooperation in problem-solving has improved. 
Philadelphia, finally overcoming "kicking and 
screaming about abandoning its old system," 
was the last county to join the SURE system in 
2005.24 
Under SURE, the role of the Pennsylvania 
Department of State has been enlarged, 
although the role of the counties remains 
substantial. The department now has respon-
sibility for maintaining the database and for 
coordinating registration records with the 
departments of transportation and health. 
Counties continue to play key roles in the 
administration of elections, by registering new 
voters, using state-designed forms, maintaining 
local voter registration records, and retaining 
authority for modification of local records. 
Also they maintain the ability to print poll 
books-a function they consider crucial for the 
smooth running of elections. 
VOTING SYSTEMS 
HAVA's voting systems requirements also 
increased the role of state government, but 
maintained county discretion in the selection 
of voting systems.25 In the November 2000 
election, three types of voting methods were 
used in the state's 67 counties, with lever 
machines accounting for 65 percent, electronic 
voting systems, 34 percent. and paper ballots, 
less than I percent. HAVA mandates affected 
all 67 counties in the state, not only those who 
had to replace their lever machines, but also 
those with electronic systems (DREs, optical 
scans, and electronic punch cards) to ensure 
that they were accessible to individuals with 
disabilities. 
The state government assumed author-
ity under HAVA to certify compliant voting 
systems. It did not challenge the local option 
of counties to replace or upgrade their 
voting systems. Rather, the Department of 
State "encouraged" them, using reimburse-
ment incentives to "procure a single HAVA 
compliant precinct count electronic voting 
system that can be used by all voters, includ-
ing persons with disabilities, that provides full 
compliance with the voting system require-
ments of Federal and State laws."26 
Pennsylvania permits, but does not require, a 
voter verifiable paper audit trail (VVPAT). The 
State Plan recognizes the points of difference 
between proponents and of opponents of 
VVPAT. Local elections officials interviewed for 
this chapter did not express a preference for 
VVPAT; rather, they expressed concerns about 
invasion of secrecy if a voter number were 
matched with the voter's choices. 
MAY 2006 PRIMARY ELECTIONS 
The May 16, 2006, primary elections were the 
first statewide test of compliance with HAVA's 
voting systems requirements. The process of 
replacing outmoded machines in time for the 
78 
primary in Pennsylvania's 67 counties could 
be characterized as "zig-zag."27 The entire 
process was initially held up because of late 
formation at the federal level of the Election 
Assistance Commission and delays in certifying 
voting systems by the federal independent 
testing authority, and, as a consequence, by 
the states. Two other factors also contributed 
to delays-a legal challenge and the inability of 
a vendor to commit to delivering machines in 
time for the May primary elections. Plaintiffs 
in Westmoreland County argued in February 
2006 in a Commonwealth (trial level) Court 
that the state constitution required voter 
approval before purchase of new machines; 
a position upheld by the judge. The ruling 
was overturned on March 3, 2006, by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the state's 
highest, which agreed with the position of the 
Department of State, namely, that federal law 
preempts state law.28 
The May primary date created another 
obstacle for timely acquisition of replacement 
machines. Advanced Voting Systems (AVS) 
was not certified by the Pennsylvania Depart-
ment of State until mid-February 2006. Ten 
counties with AVS contracts for delivery of 
machines within 90 days were informed on 
March 13, 2006, that the vendor "was doubtful 
of its ability to deliver the machines in time for 
the county to train poll workers and familiar-
ize voters forthe primary."29 While seven of 
the I 0 counties switched to other systems 
guaranteed for timely delivery, three small 
rural counties-Northampton, Lackawanna, 
and Wayne-remained with AVS. Although 
AVS subsequently delivered the machines 
two weeks before the primary and conducted 
three-day training sessions for poll workers, 
the truncated time frame was difficult for local 
officials. ''I'm at the point where I'll just be glad 
when this election is over. Everything has fallen 
in our laps. All the stress ... all the responsibil-
ity." 30 Bucks was the lone Pennsylvania county 
that failed to switch from lever to HAYA-com-
pliant machines. After the vendor with which 
it contracted for delivery of 700 electronic 
voting machines, Electec Inc .. a subsidiary of 
Danaher Corporation, indicated it could not 
deliver the machines, Bucks County com-
missioners "hastily crafted a plan to use only 
paper ballots." That plan was ruled unlikely 
to be HAYA-compliant by the state elections 
commissioner. In the end, Bucks County 
officials decided to risk the loss of $950,000 in 
HAYA funds by using lever machines.31 
On the whole, the May primary with new 
HAYA-compliant voting systems went rela-
tively smoothly in most Pennsylvania's counties. 
The director of elections of rural Wayne 
County noted the advantage of testing the 
new machines in a primary election. "Of all 
elections," she observed, "it was best to have 
a primary [with the new machines] because 
of fewer candidates and voters."32 Officials 
in urban Allegheny County, which overlies 
Pittsburgh, concurred. Despite "glitches, par-
ticularly with getting the new electronic voting 
machines started" and longer time to count 
votes than in the past, they and their counter-
parts in other western Pennsylvania counties 
were relatively pleased with the adaptation of 
voters to the new systems.33 
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VOTER EDUCATION AND ELECTION 
WORKER TRAINING 
While education of voters and training of 
election-day workers are county responsi-
bilities, the role of the state government has 
been enlarged. Respectful of the statutory 
authority of the counties for these matters, yet 
anticipating potential confusion from the use 
of new voting technology. the Department of 
State developed an extensive voter education 
and outreach program and training sessions 
for elections officials. The Pennsylvania Plan 
stipulates a wide variety of educational activi-
ties, developed in consultation and with the 
support of county boards of elections that 
were mounted across the state beginning in 
2004. Both state and local officials made clear 
that the purpose of all of these activities was 
for understanding the new voting systems and 
ensuring accessibility to them, not in generally 
extending the franchise. 
REINFORCING CENTRALIZATION 
The major effect of HAYA in Pennsylvania 
has been to reinforce a trend toward greater 
centralization in election administration. While 
the prerogatives of the counties in election 
administration remain strong, they have been 
diminished and those of the state government, 
strengthened. The trend toward centraliza-
tion of elections was in place prior to HAYA 
In part, it was attributable to the National 
Voter Registration Act (NVRA) of 1993, which 
increased the role of the state Motor Vehicles 
Department (DMV) in voter registration. The 
other centralizing influence was SURE, Penn-
sylvania's own initiative to address the problem 
of duplication of records under NVRA, which 
involved central electronic processing of reg-
istration forms by the DMV, then transmittal 
by paper to the counties. Until the NVRA and 
SURE, the "Department's role was largely 
ministerial, and it had little authority-except 
through policy direction and assistance-over 
the county boards of elections and registration 
commissions."34 
HAVA reinforced the centralization trend 
by making states accountable for compli-
ance. While Pennsylvania respected the 
constitutional authority of counties to select 
state-certified voting machines, at the same 
time, it required them to share accountabil-
ity. All 67 counties were required to submit 
written county plans prior to disbursement of 
HAVA funds by the Department of State; the 
plans detailed intended uses of HAVA funds 
and how the county would maintain current 
levels of local funding for election administra-
tion. These contractual relationships, new 
in the history of elections administration in 
Pennsylvania, were explicitly intended "as a 
means to determine a county's compliance 
with HAVA."35 
HAVA's effects have not been uniform across 
Pennsylvania's counties. The state's influence 
has been greatest on smaller, rural counties 
regarding selection of replacement voting 
machinery and accession to the SURE system. 
Counties like Philadelphia, the state's larg-
est, with its own pre-HAVA sophisticated 
electronic voter registration database and 
electronic voting machines (acquired in 2002 
with its own funds, pursuant to a 1999 city 
ballot initiative), did not welcome an enlarged 
state government role. Nonetheless, HAVA. 
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under the direction of the state government, 
trumped all of these local variations. 
NEW JERSEY AND HAVA: DELAYED 
COMPLIANCE AND POLICY 
INNOVATION 
Four general observations emerge from New 
Jersey's efforts to implement HAVA. First, 
New Jersey represents a case of delayed 
compliance with HAVA requirements, and the 
reasons for delay are different for each of the 
three main areas of reform: voter safeguards, 
statewide registration database, and voting 
system standards. Second, HAVA provided 
a stimulus for policy innovation, and those 
innovations mainly have been directed toward 
expanding voter access and participation. 
Third, the degree of partisanship in election 
policy varies by issue, and partisan differences 
are greatest on issues dealing with voter access 
and identification. Finally, HAVA and subse-
quent policy innovations that stem from HAVA 
have forced state level policymakers and local 
election officials to negotiate a tenuous bal-
ance between state responsibility and local 
control over elections. Officials in the attorney 
general's office and legislators have learned to 
value the experience and expertise local elec-
tion officials bring to the policy process, and 
they have solicited their input,36 but the lines 
of authority in the attorney general's office 
and its articulation of election administration 
polices are not entirely clear to local offkials.37 
DELAYED COMPLIANCE 
Compared with most states, the New Jersey 
legislature acted swiftly in response to HAVA. 
passing bipartisan bills (A3151 and S2348) in 
June 2003 with compliance provisions for pro-
visional balloting and voter identification,38 The 
legislation was enacted even before comple-
tion of the final report in August 2003 of the 
HAVA state planning commission. But the bill 
contained a controversial item; it required all 
voters who registered after January I, 2003, 
and had not presented personal identification 
(not just those who registered by mail for the 
first time as required by HAVA) to provide 
proof of identification at the polls. Though this 
provision extended HAVA's voter identifica-
tion requirement, legislators believed that it 
created a more uniform approach to voters 
who had registered forthe first time. But, 
at the urging of unions and other advocacy 
groups who opposed a voter identifica-
tion provision, Democratic Governor James 
McGreevey vetoed the bill. After stripping 
the bill of its voter identification language, the 
Democrat Assembly majority approved the 
bill, but the Senate, equally divided between 
Democrats and Republicans, defeated the 
measure along party lines. 
This delay caused New Jersey to be one of 
just I 0 states to miss HAVA's deadline of Janu-
ary I, 2004, for provisional voting and voter 
identification,39 After the 2003 elections, in 
which Democrats gained a majority in the 
Senate, both chambers passed in July 2004, 
and the governor signed into law S70l, a bill 
that complied with HAVA voter identification 
and provisional voting guidelines. The vote on 
S70 I reflected partisan divisions over voter 
identification. In the Assembly, all Democrats 
voted for the bill, while only two Republicans 
voted in favor and 29 voted against; in the 
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Senate all Democrats voted in favor, while only 
seven Republicans voted in favor and I 0 voted 
against.40 
In 2005, the New Jersey legislature enacted 
two additional pieces of legislation related 
to HAVA compliance standards, both with 
bipartisan support. A bill to improve poll place 
accessibility for the disabled (A3392/S 1387), 
with input from Director of Elections Ramon 
de la Cruz and local election officials, met 
and exceeded the requirements of HAVA 
and passed both chambers unanimously.41 A 
statewide registration datzbase bill (A45/S28), 
with input from the attorney general's office 
and local government officials, also passed with 
overwhelming support by the legislature with 
one just one dissenting vote in the Assembly. 
The development and implementation of the 
statewide voter registration database (SVRS) 
proved to be more difficult, revealing the 
challenges of introducing a centralized system 
in a state where local governments have tra-
ditionally run elections. The attorney general 
was slow to act on what turned out to be an 
enormous challenge: to coordinate the input 
and efforts of local governing boards, election 
officials, and various state agencies that would 
eventually share data on a single system com-
prised of voter lists that had been developed 
and maintained by the various 21 counties 
across the state. When the attorney general 
proposed a top-down centralized voter regis-
tration database, the New Jersey Association 
of State Election Officials threatened to file a 
lawsuit.42 
Eventually, the attorney general appointed 
Michael Gallagher, formerly director of admin-
istration with the Motor Vehicle Commission, 
to direct the SYRS project. Local officials 
demonstrated to Gallagher and other staff 
in the attorney general's office that vendors 
proposing to build the SVRS did not have a 
back-up system and could not guarantee that 
information would be secure if the system 
failed.43 Gallagher's solution was to allow 
local governments to keep their servers and 
maintain their voter lists. He also developed 
a communication plan consisting of system 
protocols, newsletters, weekly updates, and 
special bulletins.44 Coordination among the 
various stakeholders also improved as a result 
ofjoint Application Development (JAD) 
sessions, where the attorney general's staff, 
local election officials, and representatives of 
various state agencies involved in the project 
exchanged information and ideas and worked 
out compromises.45 Gallagher maintains that 
the state could not have developed a system 
without input from local election officials.46 
In spite of these improvements in the process, 
SVRS was not completed by the January 2006 
deadline. The delay was partially a consequence 
of the scale of the project, which Gallagher 
describes as a "comprehensive electoral man-
agement system," with "real time architecture," 
that allows voter registration information 
entered by local officials to be checked 
instantaneously by records from various state 
agencies.47 Progress also slipped as a result of 
programming problems. The SVRS was fully 
deployed in all 21 counties by May 15, 2006. 
Yet the counties brought on line last could not 
use the system during the June primaries, and 
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some individuals worry that it will take months 
to troubleshoot the complicated system. If the 
system succeeds, despite its delayed implemen-
tation, New Jersey officials contend it will be 
one of the most advanced voter registration 
databases in the nation. 
VOTING SYSTEMS 
New Jersey also lags behind many states in 
terms of making its voting systems HAYA com-
pliant, and at least some of the problems stem 
from a lack of administrative support for voting 
machine certification. An inventory report 
of the attorney general in 2004 showed that 
virtually all of New Jersey's 21 counties needed 
to be either replaced or upgraded.48 Under 
the HAYA plan, the state reimburses local 
governments for 75 percent of their costs of 
replacing voting machines. The plan also noted 
that the attorney general would need to "pro-
mulgate rules and regulations that comport 
with the latest technology of voting machines," 
and redefine the voting machine committee 
that examines machines for certification and 
charge the committee with addressing security 
issues and problems associated with access 
for disabled voters.49 Several observers have 
noted that these steps have not been taken, 
creating delay in ordering voting machines.so 
Even counties with machines in place anticipate 
training and operational problems with the 
audio kits and software designed for disabled 
access machines. 
Meanwhile, certification has been further 
complicated by a bill (A33) passed by the state 
legislature in 2005 requiring all machines to 
produce a voter-verified paper trail (VVAPT) 
of votes. Though the technology had not yet 
been fully developed when the bill passed, 
the state's estimated cost of implementing the 
new requirement was between $26.4 and $39 
million, and the local cost was "unknown." SI In 
addition to costs, issues about storing, operat-
ing, and maintaining the machines had not 
been resolved when the bill was signed into 
law.52 
ELECTION EDUCATION AND VOTER 
OUTREACH 
New Jersey contracted with the Center for 
Government Services at Rutgers University to 
develop a first-of-its-kind training course on 
election administration for election officials.53 
Professor Earnest Reock of the Center for 
Government Services involved experienced 
election experts in the development and 
instruction of a "Basic County Elections Admin-
istration.'' 54 Hundreds of election officials took 
the four-day course, which was offered in 
several locations throughout the state. Several 
counties have also involved students at local 
high schools to work at election-day polls.SS 
These efforts are generally viewed positively by 
policymakers and administrators. 
The most striking and controversial aspect of 
New Jersey's voter education program has 
been an extensive voter outreach program 
designed to increase voter registration and 
turnout. Attorney General Peter Harvey 
broadly interpreted the voter education provi-
sions of HAVA, stating that one of HAVA's 
goals was to increase voter participation and 
turnout.56 The point is stated in the HAVA 
state plan: "The fundamental goal of any elec-
toral process, at any level of government, is 
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to have the largest number of qualified voters 
turnout to vote .... This is clearly one of the 
goals of HAVA, to engage as many qualified 
voters in exercising the franchise." 57 Actually, 
though HAVA does not preclude states from 
spending funds on voter outreach, it does not 
recommend that states use federal funds to 
promote participation. HAVA's voter educa-
tion provisions are intended to support state 
efforts to provide voters with information 
about how to register and vote, and to ensure 
that every vote is counted. HAVA generally 
sought to strike a balance between access and 
ballot security often described as "making it 
easier to vote, but harder to cheat."58 Harvey's 
voter outreach program was clearly focused 
on the first part of this statement. 
In 2004, the attorney general's office launched 
its"BE POWERFUL, BE HEARD" voter edu-
cation campaign, which was explicitly designed 
to encourage young people to vote.59 Harvey 
contended: "We have to advertise voting and 
other civic responsibility the same way we 
advertise leisure activities and the same way 
we advertise beer. We need to get people 
excited about voting and explain to people 
why their vote matters.''60 The advertising 
campaign features celebrities in the entertain-
ment and sports industries. The attorney 
general held a "Hip Hop" Summit, recruited 
the New York Giants, and devoted the Divi-
sion of Elections home page to streaming 
videos from famous musicians, actors, and 
athletes.61 According to one source, Harvey 
spent $2.7 million of the $3 million in HAVA 
funds planned for voter education on the 
advertising campaign.62 The voter outreach 
campaign was the third-largest expense of the 
$28.4 million New Jersey had spent up until 
2006; $15 million was spent for new voting 
machines and the $9 million for the statewide 
voter registration system. 
The attorney general's office attributes 
increases in voter registration and voter turn-
out data, particularly among 18-24 year olds, 
in the 2004 election to the voter outreach 
campaign. 63 But the program clearly pushed 
the intention of HAVA's voter education provi-
sion toward the advocacy end of the spectrum 
and drew criticism from some observers of 
HAYA who believed the funds could have 
been used more constructively to educate 
young people about the election process.64 
HAYA AND BEYOND: POLICY 
INNOVATION IN NEW JERSEY 
New Jersey's voter outreach campaign, the 
statewide voter registration database (SVRS), 
legislation to improve disabled access to vot-
ing, and the voter verified paper audit trail 
(VVPAT), exemplify the innovative spirit of the 
state's efforts to exceed HAYA requirements. 
In 2005, the New Jersey legislature passed a 
bill (A35/SI 133) to allow no-excuse absentee 
voting, yet another example of New Jersey's 
efforts to make it easier for people to vote. 
Consistent with previous roll calls dealing 
with voter access, the bill reflected partisan 
divisions.65 Thus HAYA has been a stimulus 
for election law reform, and with the Demo-
crats in charge. those reforms have clearly 
emphasized easing voting restrictions and 
encouraging voter access to the system. 
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NEW YORK AND HAVA: 
EVENTUAL REFORM 
New York was the last state to bring its laws 
into compliance with HAYA Governor Pataki's 
signature on July 12, 2005, of the Election 
Reform and Modernization Act, adopted 
unanimously by the state legislature on June 
23, 2005, marked the end of a long and divisive 
political process. After failing to meet HAYA 
deadlines, on March I, 2006, the United States 
Department of Justice filed suit against the 
New York State Board of Elections, alleging 
violations of the Help America Vote Act. 
New York's troubles in complying with HAYA 
reflect wh.at scholars refer to as "strategic 
delay," a delay that may result from needs 
for greater clarity about policy implications, 
lack of support from key stakeholders, or 
concerns about how federal programs affect 
local preferences.66 The strategic delay in New 
York was facilitated by advocates who sought 
partisan advantage, made claims about home 
rule, or insisted on framing the issue of elec-
tion administration in terms of civil rights.67 
As a result of compromises that ended the 
strategic delay-those already reached and 
those expected as a result of the federal court 
order-the administration of elections will 
be considerably centralized. Local boards of 
elections will continue to play consequential 
roles in the elections process. So, too, will the 
advocates for change in New York's system, 
whose voices throughout the implementation 
process were forceful and effective. Ultimately, 
however, HAVA's combination of mandates 
and funding incentives changed the agenda for 
election reform in New York. 
ELECTION REFORM: THE PROCESS 
For two years after the 2000 election, election 
reform in New York was mired in gridlock, 
a consequence of partisan divisions, a strong 
tradition of home rule, an entrenched de-
centralized election system, and fierce 
advocacy groups. In 2002, HAVA-with its 
prospect of more than $235.6 million to 
replace New York's lever machines, educate 
voters, train election-day workers, and 
establish a statewide registration database-
changed the terms and the pace of election 
reform. Though the state legislature missed 
the HAVA's deadline of January I, 2004, for 
voter identification, Assembly Democrats and 
Senate Republicans reconciled their differ-
ences in time for the September 2004 primary 
elections.68 It was a compromise between 
the Assembly Democratic majority's expan-
sion of HAVA language to include 22 forms 
of acceptable voter identification (in light of 
its traditional base of poor, urban, minority 
voters, many of whom do not have a driver's 
license), and the Republican Senate majority's 
much less inclusive list responsive to its largely 
suburban base. The compromise included the 
HAVA language and allowed discretion for 
local elections boards to verify identification. 
New York sought and received a waiver to 
January I, 2006, for compliance with com-
puterized statewide voter registration list and 
voting information requirements, and was 
faced with the same deadline for compliance 
with voting systems requirements. Partisan-
ship and access advocacy were entangled 
in New York's responses to those HAVA 
mandates. Governor Pataki's designation of 
Peter Kosinski, Republican deputy executive 
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of the state Board of Elections, as chief state 
elections official-bypassing Thomas Wilkey, 
the Democratic executive director of the state 
board-generated charges of partisanship.69 
Kosinski was criticized for "failing to represent 
adequately the diverse citizens of New York 
State, especially ... racial, ethnic and language 
minority communities" in the 19-person Task 
Force he appointed, and for "preventing [the 
Task Force] from playing any significant role in 
the process of preparing the State Plan.70 The 
plan filed in August 2003 with the Election 
Assistance Commission was intended by the 
State Board as a framework for "an ongoing 
process" within which to discuss and resolve 
specific issues; it was characterized by its 
detractors as full of good intentions, but failing 
to "articulate a true plan of action."71 
Over the next two years, the Assembly 
Democratic majority and Senate Republican 
majority passed one-house bills, but failed 
to reconcile differences. Finally, with the 
January I, 2006, HAVA deadline looming, the 
legislature unanimously passed major reforms 
in New York's election system in April, May, 
and June 2005. The Election Reform and 
Modernization Act, passed at the end of 
the 2005 session on June 25, contained the 
two most dramatic reforms-development, 
maintenance, and administration of a new 
statewide registration database by the state 
Board of Elections and replacement of lever 
machines with state-certified DRE or optical 
scan machines, each with a paper record of 
votes cast. Although the statewide database 
and new voting systems were nearly foregone 
conclusions by both houses of the legisla-
ture by the time of adoption, the final bill 
reflected compromises that respected partisan 
positions, sensitivities of county boards, and 
concerns of watchdog groups and disability 
rights organizations.72 
New York's lateness in adopting laws com-
pliant with HAVA mandates bore out the 
prediction that failure of the State Plan in 2003 
to resolve contentious issues "would push 
New York to the limit in 2006."73 
VOTING SYSTEMS 
The truncated timetable for replacing New 
York's lever machines in time forthe Septem-
ber 2006 primary elections was unrealistic. 
"We think it's a massive project that requires 
time and care to get done and we would 
feel very anxious to have to run a couple of 
elections in a row with workers not familiar 
enough with these machines to carry it off 
without disenfranchising some people," a state 
board spokesman commented.74 
The Election Reform and Modernization Act 
of 2005 stipulates that state-certified DRE or 
optical scan machines, with a paper record of 
votes cast, are to replace the lever machines. 
One voting machine or system at each poll-
ing place is to accommodate voters with 
disabilities or to permit alternative language 
accessibility. The state board published draft 
voting machine regulations on November 30, 
2005, and held four public hearings in regions 
around the state in December and January. 
Civic groups, including the New York State 
Public Interest Research Group, Common 
Cause, and the League of Women Voters, 
reacted negatively to the draft regulations. 
Their comments included concerns about 
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lost votes and failure to assure full access to 
voters with disabilities and to protect language 
minorities.75 "Voting Systems Standards," 
final regulations revised in response to those 
comments, were not issued by the state board 
until May 2006. 
Implementation then shifted to a second state 
agency, the Office of General Services (OGS), 
charged with negotiating with and awarding 
contracts to vendors of HAVA-compliant 
machines. OGS issued requests for bids on 
June I, 2006. Afterthe award of contracts for 
a term of five years, the process will revert to 
the state Board of Elections for certification 
ofthe voting systems. At the same time, each 
county and New York City will begin its own 
machine selection and vender-negotiation 
processes. Finally, each local elections board 
will submit a plan to the state board detailing 
its preferred machine and how it will meet 
voter education, election worker training, and 
accessibility for persons with disabilities man-
dates in HAVA and New York State law. By 
mid-June 2006, some movement had occurred 
with regard to New York's voting systems. 
However, the basic charge of the U.S. Depart-
ment of justice against New York of failure to 
meet voting systems standards of HAVA still 
pertained. (See below for discussion of the 
lawsuit filed on March I, 2006.) 
THE STATEWIDE VOTER REGISTRATION 
DATABASE 
The challenges of developing a statewide 
voter registration database were recognized 
from the outset at both state and local levels. 
They, too, were exacerbated by late adoption 
of state legislation to bring New York into 
compliance with HAYA. "Building a statewide 
database was supposed to be simpler than 
replacing our lever machines," one local elec-
tions commissioner observed. "It turned out 
to be more complicated."76 "We knew we 
were going to be late," a state elections board 
official acknowledged, but also asserted, "We 
were not going to rush."77 
After months of consultation by the state 
Board of Elections with elections experts 
around the country, OGS issued on May 22, 
2006, a request for proposals (RFP) to build 
"NYSVoter," a statewide voter registration 
system. The broad parameters for a "bot-
toms-up" statewide database were specified 
in the 2005 New York Election Reform and 
Modernization Act: a system "whereby each 
of the 62 counties maintains its own local 
registration and election management system 
and feeds voter registration data to a statewide 
registration database." The state Board of Elec-
tions responded by adopting the "bottoms-up," 
two-phase process of the State ofWashing-
ton.78 As described in the 2003 Washington 
State Plan, the first phase was to "implement a 
single interactive state-wide voter registration 
database (VRDB) designed to interact with 
[existing] county election management systems 
and to interact in some fashion with com-
mercial election management systems (EMS) 
operating at the county level."79 The second 
phase, in cooperation with county officials, 
involved tight integration ofVRDB and EMS, 
"allowing the state to provide greatly enhanced 
voter information services to the counties. This 
phase 'include[d] building an EMS in-house to 
replace county EMS systems, or building addi-
tional tools and linkage mechanisms."' 
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The Washington State voter registration 
database was attractive to New York for 
several reasons. First, by obviating the need 
to "custom-build" or purchase a "commercial-
off-the-shelf" solution, it could expedite the 
procurement and implementation processes. 
Second, it was cost-effective since Washington 
State both offered to transfer its database 
architecture and connectivity features and 
Microsoft, its software platform, without cost 
to New York. Proposals to OGS on the bid 
date of June 28, 2006, for systems integra-
tion implementation assistance for NYSVoter 
allowed bidders to "implement and modify the 
Washington transfer solution using ... existing 
or ... alternative technologies."80 
VOTER EDUCATION AND ELECTION 
WORKER TRAINING 
Local boards of election are responsible for 
poll worker training and education of voters. 
The entire chain of steps for local installation 
of new voting machines was held up by late 
enactment of HAYA-compliant state laws. 
Without vendor contracts and certified voting 
systems, training of local elections officials, 
from commissioners to technicians to election 
inspectors, and outreach efforts to educate 
voters on new voting systems, could not be 
initiated. In brief, the ripple effects of the state 
legislature's lateness in bringing New York into 
compliance with HAYA came home to roost. 
THE U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT LAWSUIT 
AGAINST NEW YORK 
Although the state Board of Elections moved 
immediately to translate the Election Reform 
and Modernization Act into reality, it could not 
move quickly enough to meet the HAVA com-
pliance deadline of January I, 2006. For two 
months after the deadline passed, the state 
board negotiated with the U.S. Department of 
Justice to develop a consent agreement on an 
implementation timetable.Bl "We thought we 
had an agreement; it was 99 percent worked 
out," stated Lee Daghlian.B2 The Department 
of Justice determined otherwise. 
New York was the first state to be sued by the 
federal government for non-compliance with 
HAVA. Legal action was initiated on March I, 
2006, with the filing of a suit in U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of New York 
(Albany) against the New York State Board 
of Elections, the co-executive directors of the 
board, and the State of New York. Two causes 
of action were specified in the lawsuit-the 
state's failure to implement a statewide voter 
registration database and to meet voting 
systems standards of HAVA (Sections 303 and 
301, respectively). "Unless and until ordered 
to do so by the court," the Department of 
Justice stated in its petition to the court, "New 
York would not take timely action to ensure 
compliance" with these mandates of the Help 
America Vote Act.B3 
Shortly after the lawsuit was filed, a coalition 
of New York voters and civic groups, including 
New Yorkers for Verified Voting and the New 
York State League of Women Voters, filed a 
motion to intervene. The coalition was critical 
of the state for "having failed to comply with 
HAVA. when proper implementation could 
have led to proper elections" in 2006. How-
ever, the coalition contended that forcing New 
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York to overhaul its voting systems before the 
September 26 primary would "throw elections 
into complete chaos" for voters and election-
day workers using untested voting systems 
acquired in haste.B4 
Three weeks later, on March 23, 2006, U.S. 
District Court Judge Gary L. Sharpe ordered 
New York to submit by April 10, 2006, "a 
comprehensive plan for compliance with 
Sections 301 and 303(a) ofHAVA," and the 
Department of Justice to respond to the 
state's proposed compliance plan 10 days later. 
At the same time, Judge Sharpe denied the 
coalition's motion to intervene. 
THE NEW YORK PLAN FOR COMPLIANCE 
WITH HAVA 
The New York Board of Elections responded 
to the court order with a proposed remedial 
plan in two-phases: interim compliance in 
2006 and full compliance in 2007. Both phases 
concern HAVA's voting systems and statewide 
voter registration database mandates.BS 
• The Interim Voting Systems Plan focuses on 
steps to make voting devices accessible to 
persons with disabilities for the 16 Septem-
ber 2006 primary elections. Locations of 
such ballot-marking devices are to be deter-
mined on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis; 
most of the county boards of elections 
proposed to locate one machine at one 
central place (typically its central office) for 
all its disabled residents. Interim compliance 
with HAVA statewide voter registration 
requirements takes the form of initial steps 
to fully implement the Washington State 
"bottoms-up" model described above. The 
Interim Plan includes milestone tasks with 
target start and completion dates for vot-
ing systems and NYS Voter, the statewide 
database. 
• The plan for full compliance in 2007 stipu-
lates a chain of actions necessary to replace 
New York's 20,000 lever machines-from 
promulgation of regulations, certification 
of machines, contracts with vendors, to 
acceptance testing of voting equipment 
prior to use in an election-and to locate 
at least one HAYA-compliant voting system 
for individuals with disabilities in each poll-
ing place. The target for full compliance is 
the fall 2007 elections. Complete develop-
ment and implementation of NYSVoter, is 
intended to be achieved by spring 2007. 
The Full Compliance Plan does not specify 
milestone tasks and target dates. 
The response of the Department of Justice 
to the New York remedial plan was reluctant 
approval. The interim voting systems plan 
was characterized as "far less than even 
minimum compliance since [it] deals only with 
compliance with Section 30 I's requirements 
of voting system accessibility for individuals 
with disabilities and, even then, only provides 
for partial-and far from full-compliance." 
The department described the jurisdiction-
by-jurisdiction plans as "for the most part, 
very poor [but] better than nothing." With 
"great reluctance" and the desire to avoid 
"overwhelming electoral chaos" if New York 
were to attempt "replacement of all lever 
machines and achieve complete voting systems 
accessibility by the fall," the department did 
not oppose the interim voting systems plan 
of the state board. Regarding the plan for full 
compliance in 2007, given New York's "record 
to date," the department requested the court 
to order the state board to submit by July 15, 
2006 a "detailed schedule for long-term vot-
ing systems compliance." The department 
was less critical of the interim and long term 
plans for development and implementation 
L_ ____ _ 
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of NYSVoter, the statewide voter registration 
database, agreeing that, on full implementa-
tion, "New York should be in full compliance 
with Section 303 (a) of HAVA." Nonetheless, 
it requested that the state board submit a 
detailed scheduled by June 15, 2006, of imple-
mentation milestones to the court.86 
Judge Gary Sharpe accepted the remedial 
plan submitted by the state Board of Elections 
on June 2, 2006, viewing it as leading, "upon 
full implementation, to full compliance with 
HAVA." "The actions that the State and local 
jurisdictions in New York to partially comply 
with HAVA forthe fall 2006 elections," he 
wrote, "will provide a practicable measure of 
compliance tempered by the need to ensure 
that the right of every voter to vote is not 
impaired and that the orderly conduct of the 
election process itself is not in any manner 
jeopardized." At the same time, retaining the 
court'sjurisdiction, he ordered more submis-
sions by the state board than were requested 
by the Department of Justice. They were four 
separate filings, in June, August, and Septem-
ber 2006, of efforts by each county and New 
York City to ensure privacy of the individual 
vote of each voter with disabilities, a detailed 
schedule for replacing all lever machines, regu-
lations for NYSVoter, and a detailed schedule 
to develop and implement the statewide 
registration list. Finally, he ordered the state 
Board of Elections to submit bi-weekly reports 
through November 7, 2006, and monthly 
reports thereafter of progress in implementing 
his Remedial Order.87 
GETTING HAVA RIGHT 
ANDON TIME 
"New York," an elections official observed, 
"has been more concerned about getting 
HAVA right than doing it on time." Filtered 
through the lenses of partisanship in the legis-
lature, demands by advocacy groups, and local 
claims for election control, "getting HAVA 
right" was inextricably linked to strategic 
delays in implementation. The federal court 
order has changed the timetable for imple-
mentation. New York must now not only "get 
it right," but "do it on time." 
CONCLUSION 
How did states with traditionally decentral-
ized election systems respond to a law that 
requires greater state centralization in election 
administration? The short answer to this 
question is that they did so with difficulty and 
in different ways. Delays in Pennsylvania were 
largely a result of tensions between state 
and local officials, certification problems, and 
the magnitude of the task of replacing voting 
machines in 67 counties. The causes for delay 
in New Jersey depended on the issue. A lack 
of leadership at the outset of the process and 
functional problems later on stalled the effort 
to build a statewide registration database; 
partisan differences over voter identification 
prevented the state from meeting voter safe-
guard requirements on schedule; and unclear 
certification guidelines, problems with installing 
disabled access equipment, and apprehension 
over the VVPAT slowed the process of install-
ing and upgrading voting equipment. Some 
observers suggest that the prevalent delays 
in implementing HAVA in New jersey stem 
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from its institutional structure. New Jersey is 
the only state in which the attorney general 
is the chief elections official. In addition to 
commingling law enforcement with administra-
tive functions, this arrangement may weaken 
the administrative capacity of the Division of 
Elections, as it competes with other priorities 
of the office.SS New York suffered the longest 
delays in enacting enabling legislation, due to 
intense partisanship, local traditions, and advo-
cacy group demands. Then, further complexity 
resulted from converting such legislation into 
new HAYA-compliant voting systems across 
the state and creating an operational statewide 
registration database in time for 2006 elec-
tions. If not for the force of a federal judge, 
the prospects for implementing HAVA in New 
York would still be dim. 
A few common themes emerged with respect 
to the consequences of HAVA. First, though 
HAVA compliance required greater state 
responsibility over essential aspects of elec-
tion administration, the federal legislation also 
served as a stimulus for innovation. These 
innovations varied across the states and they 
emerged in the context of HAVA require-
ments (such as the statewide databases, voter 
education, and voting system standards), and 
somewhat tangentially as a consequence of 
the increased attention to election reform. 
Second, compliance decisions and policy 
innovations were advanced through admin-
istrative, legislative, and legal channels, and in 
some cases through more than one of these. 
Those decisions required a blend of complex, 
technical information about tasks like program-
ming a database or developing protocols 
for certification, philosophical and partisan 
debates over voter identification and access, 
and practical issues about the interaction of 
voters with election officials and poll workers. 
Third, because of the technical and practical 
issues, state-level policymakers had to engage 
local election officials who had the experience 
and expertise needed to gain HAYA compli-
ance. HAYA unquestionably required greater 
state responsibility in election administration, 
but involving local officials in both legislative 
and administrative decisions was essential, 
particularly in the development of statewide 
voter registration databases. Fourth, delays 
in meeting HAYA deadlines for voting equip-
ment normally resulted from state and local 
politics, the certification process, and the 
availability of machines. One could argue rea-
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